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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utal1 
~rOSES BLANCH..-'\RD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
-vs-






·sTATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents believe appellant's statement of facts 
is incomplete, erroneous and misleading in part, and 
therefore do not adequately "picture" to this court the 
basis for the lower court's decision and so considers 
that the following corrective as well as additional facts 
will be helpful, particularly because appellant attempts 
to stress bits of isolated and unimportant testimony 
which the lower court refused to follow as being con-
trolling. In this regard it is also pointed out that 
the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and 
observed their demeanor and conduct on the witness 
stand, and was therefore in a favorable position 
to weigh the testimony. Under these circumstances, 
the judgment of the trial court should not be 
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lightly disregarded. The trial court found all of the 
is~ues in favor of the defendants. 
rrhe defendants are husband and wife and each of 
the1n of the age of 58 years. The -defendant, Fern P. 
Snlith, is an only child of Frank Purser, deceased, and 
she bought the property from her father's estate April 
12, 1941, and ever since then defendants' son and his 
wife have resided thereon. Frank Purser purchased the 
property under contract from George Tiller in 1916 and 
he resided upon the property from that time to the time 
of his death. Ever since 1916, Frank Purser in his 
lifetime ,and since his death, these defendants, have 
always had and claimed the property between their 
north and south fence lines ( tr. 4) without-..interruption 
or claim on the part of anybody and had no suggestion 
from any source that the property within the fence 
lines was claimed -by anyone until the year 1948 when 
the plaintiff claimed to be the owner of 19 feet north 
of defendants' south fence line. 
Both plaintiff and defendants' property is derained 
from a common source: via Halvor 0. Tiller's estate. 
~ Tiller acquired the property January 8, 1879. (Def Ex. 
1 page 4). He died Feb. 28, 1901, leaving surviving him 
three daughters, Anna, Helen, and Edith, then of the 
ages of 20, 17, and 15 years, respectively, and a son, 
George, then of the age of 13 years. Decree of dis-
tribution was entered July 5, 1902, and the real pro-
perty was distributed by metes and bounds to three 
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of the children, J1~dith getting the south 4 rods, (now 
O\\"ned by plaintiff), George the middle piece( now 
O\vned by defendants), and Helen the north part not 
directly involved in this action. ( Defs. Ex. 1 page 5). 
Although plaintiff so states on page 2 of his brief, never· 
theless none of the property so distributed by decree of 
distribution ""'"as surveyed during probate (tr. B 6-8). 
It is plain that the survey was made at the time of the 
sale of Edith's tract of land to plaintiff about three 
years later. (tr. 60, 66). Edith conveyed to plaintiff 
August 1, 1904 (Pis. ex. A, page 6). This then made 
plaintiff and George Tiller, who was then about 14 
or 15 years of age adjoining landowners. It is plain that 
the court was justified in finding from the testimony 
of Edith Tiller, George Tiller and Anna T. Peery that 
the estate property when distributed was all in one 
enclosure, bounded on the south by a fence line (tr. 3-4), 
on the east by a solid picket fence, on the north by 
Logan River~ ''or maybe a wire fence," on the west by 
Brigham Young College Campus, which is separated 
from the Tiller property by a slough as well as a fence. 
At the time, or shortly after plaintiff purchased 
his property, he wanted to know the boundry lines. No 
one knew them. ( tr. 4, 5, 60, 45-46). Anna Tiller at-
tempted to fix the lines by measuring herself, but at 
the suggestion of attorney W. W. ~1aughan a surveyor 
was called and he, the surveyor, fixed the boundary 
lines. (tr. 60-61, 4, 5). Plaintiff claims at page 2-3 of 
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hi::.; brief that Logan City owned 1 rod of land "which 
the lower court refused to notice, meet or recognize" 
(finding No. 6- tr. 13), "and that _this fooled 
tbPJn all," but there is nothing in the record 
to show that the surveyor was directed in his survey. 
l~.,rom all that appears in the record he simply performed 
his survey professionally. In fact the court found Logan 
City never owned the 1 rod strip. Plaintiff and his 
predecessor, the Tillers, have always been in possession 
of the property. Plaintiff never used or claim-
ed any of the property north of the fence while Anna 
Peery lived there which was until 1908 ( tr. 62), or 
while George Tiller lived there until 1916 ( tr. 2, 5, 6), 
or while Mrs. Grace w. Tiller, wife of George Tiller, 
lived there from 1909 to 1916 (tr.73), or while Frank 
Purser and these defendants lived there (tr. B 24-30) 
(tr. 22, 23, 75, 76). In fact while defendants have 
owned the property plaintiff tore down and rebuilt 
part of the: original fence in the same place ( tr. 75, 76) 
and yet plaintiff states (page 2 of brief tr. 76) that 
he knew for a long time that the fence was not on 
the boundary line. But then plaintiff states too he 
never entertained any thought that the fence was not 
on true line until 1948, about 45 years after he built 
the original fence and this was after rebuilding it in 
· part; that he first questioned the fence when the curb 
and gutter was put in by Logan Ci~y in 1948 (tr.41, 
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-!8) .. A.fter the fence 'Yas built plaintiff built his house, 
garage~ chicken coup, etc., all 'vith reference to the 
fence line (tr. 40-42) .. l\.lso planted trees (tr. B 45) 
(tr. B 7-S). G. Blanchard states inconsistently that al-
though he had no idea they o\\rned anything north of 
the fence line yet they claimed and used it as right-of-
"Tay ( tr. 37). And then plaintiff claimed his use was 
onl~-r because agreeable to his neighbors (tr. 36, 37, 79). 
All of defendants' witnesses denied any use at all. 
Ever since erection of fence by plaintiff he has 
been in possession of the property south of the fence 
line and has paid taxes thereon upon receipt of a 
tax notice wherein the property was described in form 
as conveyed to him, and the defendants and their pre· 
decessors in interest have always done likewise. Each 
have always paid for the sidewalk and sewer improve-
ments according to the frontage (tr. B 18) of the re-
spective tracts they were in possession of and plain-
tiff has always been in possession of 4 rods. When the 
curb and gutter was put in Logan City adopted a dif-
ferent method of assessing the cost thereof-from the 
record instead of according to the actual frontage 
covered-(tr. B 73-80) and this was the first time 
plaintiff even thought that the property described in 
the deed and that which he was actually in possession of 
might not be identical. (tr. 32). He learned this from 
a notice which appeared in the newspaper. (pls. ex. 
C) $16.50 then remained unpaid to Logan City. Plain-
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tiff paid the $16.50 to Logan City and upon learning of 
it defendants offered to repay him. (tr. B 21), and so 
Logan City quitclaimed 1 rod strip to plaintiff. (Pls. 
ex. l")). Because of this expenditure of $16.50 for the 
quitclahn deed, he, plaintiff, wanted to move the fence 
line north 19 feet (16Yz feet by reason of the rod covered 
in the quitclaim deed, and also 2Yz feet which he said 
he was short between the fence lines upon which he 
had lived for 45 years or more), and in the alternative 
complains that the lower court failed to compensate 
him for taxes, etc., mentioned at the top of page 6 
of his brief. Appellant claims that because Logan City 
conveyed to him there was a mutual mistake of fact. 
If this is so then everytime a boundary line established 
by the parties is in error, there is a mutual mistake 
of fact. The issue as to the 19 ft. was made by defen-
dants counterclaim. No objection was made during the 
trial. See rule 15 (244 P. 2, 360). Appellant also claims 
the court erred in finding : ''Through a mixup in 
connection with the assessment of property, the said 
1 rod above referred to has never been assessed for 
taxes. '' If Logan City never paid any taxes thereon, 
nor did these defendants and their predecessors who 
owned the excess in the block, then why is the court 
not correct~ Furthermore, how did this harm appel-
lant~ He does not show. He, appellant, only paid 
taxes on the property he was in possession of. 
We will answer appellant's argument and statements 
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in the order advanced in his brief and also show the 
lo"rer court ~s decision in the matter is eminently equit-
able and fair and corrert and should be affirmed. 
ARGl~iliENT 
POINT NO. 1: THE LOWER COURT FULLY MET 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS 
.A. ~IISTAKE OF F.L\.CT AND UPON SUBSTANTIAL 
E'TIDENCE DECIDED THE ISSUES AGAINS1., 
HI~I. 
Beginning at page 8 in an attempt to show a mistake 
of fact he quotes bits of testimony from the record. It 
is garbled. On page 9 Geo. Tiller is quoted as saying: 
''I never heard before that the surveyor gave me over 
5 rods and Blanchard less than three.'' I have searched 
the record and I can find no such statement. At page 
10 counsel puts the following question to Geo. Tiller, 
"According to your testimony he gave Mose less than 
3 rods and he gave you about 5 and a fraction,'' to 
which the witness answered: ''Why~'' Question: ''Be-
cause that fence is down there 19 feet on his ground." 
.A.nswer: "I never heard that before." This is far froxn 
being the statement claimed for by counsel. Both ques-
tions asked for by counsel assumed facts unfair to the 
witness, but the court was not mislead because of the 
form of the question. The last question even intimates 
plaintiff owned the land he claims to have acquired from 
Logan City by the quitclaim deed in 1904 when the 
property was surveyed. The next statement counsel 
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quotes is also equally garbled: ''I didn't intend to deed 
a"~ay any of Blanchard's property." (tr. 14). The 
court's attention is directed to tr. 14. The statement 
"·a~ not 1nade by the witness as given l.n the brief. Line 
13-'' And you didn't intend. to deed part of Mose 
Blanchard's property." Answer: "No sir, I didn't.'' 
... ~gain the question even assumes Blanchard had pro· 
perty there in 1904. No where in the record is there 
any such claim. The substance of the remaining testi-
Inony quoted by appellant to the effect that Geo. Tiller 
figured Mose Blanchard got 4 rods south of the fence, 
that the deeds would call for the right. property, is 
no doubt correct. The witness so thought. Both Blanch-
ard and Geo. Tiller believed the fence ws put where 
it should be. TheY: both belived the surveyor was right 
and from that time on regarded it as the boundry 
line of their property. 
The balance of the testimony quoted on page 9 and 
at the top of page 10 is tricky. ''That one rod fooled 
us all, I am satisfied about that." "When <lid you 
find out about that." These answers are based upon 
the correctness of counsel's question that Logan City 
owned the one rod and that the surveyor was fooled. 
It is against finding No. 6 of the court that Logan City 
never was the owner of the 1 rod. The giving of a quit· 
claim deed does not imply the conveyance of any 
particular interest in property. The grantee acquires 
only the interest of the, grantor, be that interest what 
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it 1nay. Nix Y~. Tooele Co., 118 Pac. 2d 376 (Utah). 
And the court's finding is well ~upported by the evi-
dence. See full testin1ony of 'vitnesses Crockett and 
1larler, transcripts .. :-\ and B. Neither abstract introduced 
in evidence sho,Ys Logan City to be the o'vner of the 
1 rod of property. The abstractor who testified at 
the trial (tr. SS, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95) says Logan City 
never had title so far as his search reveals. Just 
ho'Y long since the south fenee 'vas built is not certain, 
but Anna T. Peery, who was 71 years when she 
testified in court upon the trial (tr. 59) stated the fence 
was up when she was a child because ''us kids used 
to sit on the fenee and watch the circus go through 
that lane to get to the B. Y. Campus when we were 
young" (tr. 64). That during all these years no action 
has been orought by anyone to move the fence or to 
claim that plaintiff or his predecesors in interst were 
not the true and lawful owners of the property to the 
south fence. Only the plaintiff wants to move his north 
fenee because Logan City gave him a quitclaim deed 
after he himself built the fence about 45 years ago. He 
is also envious because he thinks George Tiller and 
subsequently these defendants as his successors in 
interest got more land out of the Tiller Estate than 
he did. There no doubt was a surplus in the block (tr. B 
8, 9, 11). The north line of the Tiller esate property 
was not certain (tr. 13, 14). The river had been moved 
(tr. 67). A new road had been built to the B. Y. Campus. 
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the fence lines \Yt~re even established by tenants of 
the o"~ners thus negativing entirely any agreement on 
the part of the O"\vners ; they did, ho,vever, recognize 
the fence lines as the boundry line by acquiescence and 
"·onld not therefore later be permitted to deny that it 
\Yas the boundry line. _..:-\ppellant quotes, but fails to 
sho'v just ho\Y his facts fit into Holmes vs, Judge. 
In Tripp vs. Bagley, supra, the facts are different. 
There both parties kne'v when the fence was being 
built the fence " ... as not on the true boundry line. There 
'Yere no per1nanent improvements placed in reliance 
upon an established fence boundry line. C~rtainly ap-
pellant would not undertake to say in the case at 
bar both parties knew where the true line was. If so, 
why then even ask where the line was~ Why take the 
word of a survyor~ vVhy build buildings with reference 
to the line and observe it as the boundry line for about 
45 years? Appellant cannot by any analogy bring these 
facts within those of the Tripp case. 
Rydalch vs. Anderson, supra, is a case where the 
original owners built a boundary line fence 'before the 
property was surveyed by the government. so that at 
the time neither could possibly know where the true 
line was. Later a survey was made so that the section 
lines and corners were then well established and easily 
ascertainable. But the owners still continued to regard 
the fence as a boundry line. Said the court at page 
29, right-hand column: 
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''That the boundry was open, and visibly marked 
on the ground by a fence which appellant's 
seemed anxious to maintain and make per-
manent long after he had obtained title from 
the United States to the land in dispute, and 
long after the land had been surveyed, so that 
he at least had the means of ,knowledge, if 
he did not actually know where the government 
lines were located, is also beyond cavil." And 
again, ''The whole world, including respondent, 
therefore had a right to assume that the owner-
ship of the land in fact was what those in 
interest held it out to be. Appellant, as the mere 
successor of his father, is estopped, if his father 
would have been.'' The court then concludes 
that the father would be estopped. 
Respondent believes this case also is in his favor. 
In fact, in the case at bar, one element here is more 
flagarant: Plaintiff even testified that he knew for a 
long time that the fence was wrong, that it was 2Y2 
feet short of giving him 4 rods, and still the record 
is silent about him ever complaining to either George 
~riller, Frank Purser, or the defendants, and yet he 
now wants to move the fence although it has been 
up for about 45 years, during all of which time he 
regarded it as the boundry line. That the fence line 
was visible and well established, see picture exhibits 
and tr. B. The lower court in its finding no. 3 ( tr. 12) 
in addition to stating that the means of ascertaining 
the true line has always been available, could have 
gone further and found that the plaintiff actually kne'v 
(according to his own tesimony) that the fence was 
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11ot on the true line, and did nothing throughout the 
vears but held out that it was on the true line bv 
. .. 
acknowledging the fence and so i8 now for that reason 
estopped. Rydalch P. Anderson, supra. 
Counsel for appellant at page 11 of brief states 
that the la"'" here involved is annotated in 69 ALR1430-
1533, following, Tripp vs. Bagley, supra, and that altho 
there are some cases to the contrary, the big majority 
there cited under the subhead "Effect of Mistake" 
hold in harmony with Brown vs. Milliner. It is sub-
mitted that this statement is not borne out either by 
the facts or as to the law. As above shown, 
the facts in the case of Tripp vs. Bagley and 
those in the case at bar are as different as is night 
from day. The Trip case is discussed in Brown vs. 
Milliner, supra, and at page 208, left-hand column, 
in that case the court says : 
"But the Tripp case does not require a party 
relying upon a boundary which has been ac-
quiesced in for a long period of time to produce 
evidence that the location of the true boundary 
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That 
the true boundary was uncertain or in dispute 
and that the parties agreed upon the recognized 
boundary will be implied from the parties' 
long acquiescence.'' 
In this case the defendant could know nothing about how 
the fence line was established (they are now 58 years 
of age) were it not for the fact that George Tiller 
and his sister, Mrs. Peery are still alive and so when 
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plaintiff 'van ted to move the fence line they investigated. 
Appellant then at page 11 cites Brown vs. ~1:illiner, 
supra, to the effect that this case holds "that when 
a party has acted under a mistake of fact, especially 
a mutual mistake of fact, such party is not estopped, 
but may claim to the true line upon discovery of the 
mistake just as plaintiff tried to do when he discoverd 
his mistake.'' It is submitted that the holding in that 
case justifies no such state1nent 'vhen attempt is made 
to fit these facts into that statement. In that case the 
lower court was reversed because the record did not 
sustain the lower court's finding that ''the old channel 
of Weber River was mutually recognized and acquiesced 
in as the boundry between the property now owned 
by the palintiff and the defendant." (Page 208, lower 
left-hand column) No stretch of the imagination could 
contend such statement fit the facts in the case at bar. 
Here the plaintiff recognized the fence the court 
found he built during all the, time George Tiller and his 
successors in interest, Frank Purser and these defen-
dants, have resided upon the property, until 1948 when 
first complaint was made. Defendants' contend that 
Brown vs. Milliner is also a case in their favor and 
rely upon it. 
Counsel then at the top of page 12 of brief refers 
· to and quotes from some cases cited bginning on page 
1486 of 69 ALR, many of which are old southern ones. 
A reference to these cases show that the factual basis 
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for the quotes are so different from the facts in the 
case at bar that the quotes cannot possibly have any 
1neaning so far as this case is concerned. Nor do they 
represent the 1uajority vie\v. It is belived that the 
cases cited on pages 1485 and 1486 of 69 ALR under 
the title "Effect of ~[istake" are more in keeping 
\\~ith the decisions and trends of the holding of our 
own court. Many of the cases cited are western ones, 
and the facts given are for the most part applicable. A 
case very similar in facts to the case at bar is Davies 
vs. Lynham 247 Pac. 294 (Utah) cited in Brown vs. 
~Iilliner at page 207. See also Am. Jur. Boundaries, 
Effect of Mistake of Fact, Sec. 77, citing 69 ALR 1485 
to the effect that landowners may when in doubt as 
to boundary line orally agree where it shall be etc., and 
also to the effect when innocent third parties have 
intervened they may be estopped, as also they may be 
upon discovery of the true line if they do not immediately 
disavow the oral line agreed upon, citing 69 ALR 1486. 
Point No. 3: THE PARTIES DID NOT KNOvV 
FENCE WAS NOT ON THE TRUE LINE. 
At the top of page 13 counsel next states: "Parties 
knew fence was not on true line.'' This statement just 
simply is not borne out by the facts. Certainly at the 
time the survey was made neither party knew where 
the dividing line was and that is the time that counts 
and there is nothing in the record to show that defend-
ants or any of their predecessors at any time were 
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aware that the fence was not on the true boundary 
line as called for by their respective deeds. But plain-
tiff upon the trial stated that he knew for a long time 
the fence was not on the line. If he did, w4y then did 
he not complain~ ,Just when did he learn this, if he 
kne'v it~ As late as 1943, he rebuilt part of the fence, 
and this was done after the defendants became the 
owner of the property. Why did he do this~ That such 
facts do not bring this case within the holding of Tripp 
vs. Bagley is too obvious for discussion. If plaintiff 
knew the boundary line was in error then he concealed 
such fact from all of the parties who have resided on the 
premises and he should not now be rewarded for such 
conduct. I cannot find any justification for counsel's 
statement on page 14 that the Tripp case says: "If 
one of the adjoining landowners has knowledge, or 
understands, that the fence in question is not on the 
true line, the rule permitting a boundary line to be 
fixed by parol agreement or acquiescence does not 
apply." I believe the case stands for no such rule. 
Even if it did, then it is submitted that it must refer 
to knowledge of error at the time the fence is located, 
not knowledge later acquired, because even then no 
matter when acquired, certainly it becomes the duty 
of the party to make the error known promptly unless 
he desired to waive or ratify the error. He cannot idly 
sit by. And even if he does make it know many cases 
still hold that if the fence has been up for many years 
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and agreed upon as the dividing line it cannot then 
be 1uoved, particularly if innocent third parties have 
relied upon the fence line. 
Point No.4: THERE WAS DISPUTE AND UN-
CERTAIN~Y ACTUALLY AND LEGALLY: 
.A.t page 14 counsel next discusses ''No Dispute and 
No l~ncertainty" and then states that the court "found 
that there had never been any dispute concerning the 
boundary line between them.'' This statement is mi~­
leading and it is subn1itted not accurate. The court 
found in finding No. 2 (tr. 9) that all of the parties 
were in doubt as to the location of the boundary line 
so that the line separating plaintiff's property and 
George Tiller's property was unknown and uncertain. 
A surveyor was then called and he made a survey and 
upon this line (thus accepting the findings of the 
surveyor) the. fence was mutually agreed to be and 
upon which the plaintiff erected the fence. In finding 
No. 3 (tr. 11) the court found that after the erection 
of the fence each used the lands adverse to the other 
and that neither defendants nor their predecessors in 
interest ''ever knew that there was any thought of 
dispute as to the property line until at the time here-
in-before mentioned.'' This refers, of course, to after the 
erection of the fence and not before. That the plaintiff 
and defendants and their grantors testified that there 
was no dispute concerning the boundary line simply 
shows that they all regarded the fence as the boundary 
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line. It does not refer to before the fence was built. 
Appellant then quotes from Talbot vs. Smith, 107 
Pac. 480 (Ore) to defeat the description in a deed the 
plaintiff urged that a fence line or stake set up by 
so1neone has been acquiesced in and should control. And 
in Jefferies vs. Sheehan 242 Mich. 167, 218 N. W. 703, 
where the language quoted shows there never was a 
dispute. These statements upon their face show that the 
facts are entirely different from those at bar and 
can have no application. In passing it should be observed 
also that in Talbot vs. Smith, supra, syllabus No. 4, 
it is stated that even where the fence is by mistake 
supposed to be on the boundary line that after ten 
years of adverse occupancy by another under claim of 
title it could not be moved. Defendants and their pre-
decessors in interest have been in possession for about 
45 years. Counsel then states that defendant's cannot 
succeed in their conuterclaim for they have failed to 
pay taxes. In answer to this it might be asked, how 
then can plaintiff succeed when they have been out 
of possession of the 19 foot strip for about 45 years. 
The answer of course is that this is a boundary line 
case which defendants set up in their counterclaim. 
The recognized rule is in keeping with the finding 
of the lower court that the line sought to be established 
be doubtful, uncertain or in dispute. See 8 Am. Jur. 
Boundaries, Sec. 7 4, page 799, the cases cited follow-
ing note 11 including 69 ALR 1443, et seq, wherein is 
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cited Tripp vs. Bagley, supra. The subject, "Necessity 
and sufficiency of dispute or uncertainty'' is further 
annotated in 113 ALR page 425, et seq, to which 
reference is made. Appellant seetns to labor under the 
impression that in order for there to be a ''dispute'' 
it is necessary for there to be a fight or a quarrel. 
Such is not the case. The annotation just referred to 
cites an excellent number of illustrations. They hold 
for example : ''No dispute in the sense of a quarrel 
or ill feeling between the parties is necssary. '' Moniz 
vs. Peterman 31 Pac. 2d 353 (Calif.). If the location 
of the line between contiguous landowners has not 
been definitely established, or is otherwise doubtful 
a.nd uncertain, and they orally agree to be bound 
by a line then established by the agreement, the 
agreed line will be adhered to by the court. 
Sammann vs. Dietrich (Tex.) 39 SW (2d) 647. 
It is not necessary that the true line be absolutely 
unascertainable, nor that it could have ·been determined 
by a survey. Sobol vs. Gulinson( Colo.) 28 Pac. 2d, 
810. In fact, in Coleman vs. Smith, 55 Tex. 254 re-
ferred to in 69 ALR page 1485 attention is drawn to 
the fact that even different surveys may differ. In 
Caputo vs. Mariatti (1934) Pa. Super. Ct. 314, 173 A. 
770, the owner of a plot of ground subdivided it into 
lots, placing stakes in the ground, that thereafter 
purchasers of two contiguous lots erected a division 
fence following the stakes, and the court held the 
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stakes controlled. The above are simply a few of the 
1nany cases cited in the annotations referred to which 
shows the kind of dispute and uncertainty necessary, 
legally. 
Appellant then contends uncertainty or indefinite-
ness 'vas not proved by making reference to 11 C.J.S. 
538 .. 9. and also Hartun vs. Witte (1884) 59 Wis. 285, 
18 N.W. 174. Such a contention is thoroughly unsound. 
It is in conflict with all bound.aries established orally 
and does not fall within the subject under consideration. 
That question is treated in the same work counsel 
refers to 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Sec 67, page 638 and. 
sections following. Appellant next states the burden of 
proof is upon respondents and cites 8 Am. Juris. 
page 810 and 69 ALR 1489. Respondents agree with 
this and contend they fully discharged this burden 
upon the trial. 
' 
Point No. 5: THE LOWER COURT WAS COR-
RECT IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN 
.1\GREEMENT. 
Inasmuch as this has been previously treated by a 
reference to the survey made, that plaintiff lived with 
the fence for 45 years without objection, re-built part 
of it as late as 1943, it is so obvious that he agreed to 
the fence as the boundary line that this will not be 
pursued further. In Holmes vs. Judge, supra, it was 
held that there need be no agreement if the parties 
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reeognized the fence sufficiently long. See also 8 Am. 
Jur. Boundaries, Sec. 75, page 799. 69 ALR 1466. 
Acquiescence. See 69 ALR 1491 (citing Inany Utah cases) 
further annotated in 113 ALR 432. When acquiescence 
l1as been for sufficiently long time it is immaterial 
that established line does not agree with conveyances. 
Counsel next states that the court found: "plaintiff's 
property was distributed in accordance with the survey 
directed by the late W. W. Maughan." I am unable 
to find any such finding by the court. Finding No. 2 
and 3 ( tr. 9-10) is directly contra. There is positively 
nothing in the eivdence to show any survey was made 
at any time during probate of the Tiller estate. Dis-
tribution was simply made by metes and bounds, but 
no survey was had. To so distribute is a common 
practice with which every lawyer is familiar. Next 
counsel says: ''Why would plaintiff want a survey 
2>1 years later~ ' ' I can find no such evidence to this 
effect. But if so, then why does he let the matter go 
on for an additional 42Yz years and then attempt to 
change a boundary he permitted to remain and later 
purchased by innocent third parties~ If he did this, then 
he should now certainly be estopped. See 8 Am. J ur. page 
800, Sec, 77, Effect of Mistake of Fact, where the rights 
of innocent third parties have intervened. Also 69 ALR 
1485- 86, 1520. 
Appellant at page 17 and 18 makes further reference 
to testimony and attempts to ''make fun'' of some of 
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it. Reference to contra testimony has previously been 
given and so no further comment will here be made. 
llowever, it must be brought to the court's attention 
that Anna Peery, now of Ogden, and Mr. and ~Irs,, 
George Tiller, now of Brigham City, all testified that 
'vhile they lived next door to plaintiff that they were 
always neighborly and friendly. They were unacquainted 
~ith defendants, (tr. B 10).. Yet when called upon to 
testify their unbiased testimony favored the defendant8. 
There was no reason to disbelieve either or any of them 
and the lower court who saw them apparently had no 
hesitation in believing them. The statements counsel 
criticize for being made by Mrs. Peery at the bottom 
of page 17 are: "I know he built it because I saw him. 
I didn't build it. My father didn't build it. I say Mose 
did it or his boys did." It is perfectly understandable 
how any witness while on the stand could so testify 
and yet not be any ground for questioning her cred-
ibilty. The attempt to discredit because Mrs. Peery 
inadvertently used the words ''or his boys did it'' 
j s ridiculous. 
At page 4 appellant mentions that the court failed 
to bring in as third parties the Federal Land Bank be-
cause of an unsatisfied mortgage and the State of 
Utah because of the existence of a Public Welfare Lien, 
both given by plaintiff, in violation of Civil Rules 13(g). 
The record does not show that counsel for appellant 
even suggested bringing them in to the court. If counsel 
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· regarded their presence necessary for a compltete .deter-
mination under the rule, then he should have made the 
suggestion to the court rather than now con1plain. Nor 
does he show ho'v failure to bring in either or both of 
the1n failed to give complete relief in the action, and it 
is difficult to see just why they should be made parties. 
If either party viewed,t the property at all before· 
tnaking the Inortgage they certainly made it with re-
ference to fence lines as being the property line and 
if so, upon a foreclosure the mortgage can always be 
corrected to properly describe the property intended . 
. A.t any rate, all counsel does is mentions the matter. 
He does not argue or cite any authority so he must 
be deemed to have waived the matter. 
Point No.6: COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT-
TING DESIGNATION TO BE TARDILY FILED 
NOR SHOULD RULE 75(b) BE AMMENDED. 
Finally at page 19 appellant complains that con-
trary to the spirit and purpose of Rule 75 (e) the court 
arbit!arily required him to furnish respondents' with 
the entire transcript; On June 21, 1952 counsel for 
appellant served on counsel for respondent, Designa-
tion of Record, etc., ( tr. 35) in which appears among 
other things the simple statement: ''Transcript of the 
evidence served herewith.'' Later when counsel obtained 
the transcript for purpose of preparation of appeal it 
\Yas observed that the notes transcribed were only 
those requested by counsel for appellant, that in no 
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instance 'vas the full testimony of any witness report .. 
ed and that approximately one-third of the testimony 
'vas eliminated in the opinion of the reporter, ( tr. 
148) (It finally turned out that 82 pages were omitted 
and 96 transcribed). In other words, counsel for appel-
lant had ordered transnribed for the use of respondents 
such testin1ony as he chose. At the time of service 
of the designation there was nothing to indicate that 
the whole of the preceedings had not been transcribed. 
If only part was transcribed, it should have expressJs 
so stated or counsel should have been so advised. At any 
rnte, it mislead counsel for respondents. He therefort~ 
filed Demand for Additional Evidence, etc., (tr. 39 
to 43) and counsel complains at the court's order 
requiring entire transcript of evidence. The record 
further shows that this cause was tried Sept. 21, 1951, 
and that several continuances was had. 
Appellant complains that no designation was made 
as to what additional testimony was required to be 
transcribed. Such a request it is submitted is unreason-
able and not contemplated by any rule. No lawyer 
could be expected to recall what bits or even large 
portions of important testimony was elin1inated, or 
the materiality thereof.He could not therefore be able 
to designate what omitted part should be added without 
having the court reporter read the notes to him and such 
a requirement should not be imposed upon any respon-
dent. Respondents use of transcript on appeal should 
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never be limited to what appellant's counsel thinks he 
should have. In this instance, for example, all of the 
testhnony explanatory of the picture exhibits have been 
o1nitted, ·besides 1nuch corroboration testimony. Then 
too abstracts gotten out in piecen1eal are not satis-
factory. That is apparent fron1 the transcripts furnished 
here,vith because it is very difficult to read the second 
transcript marked '' B '' even though the reporter made 
references in the best way he knew how. 
Rule 75 (b) Transcript, provides in part as follo,vs: 
"If the designation does not include all of the evidence~ 
the appellant shall file a copy of such part thereof 
as the respondent may need to enable him to designate 
the part he desires to have added, and if the appellants 
fail to do so the court on motion may require him 
to furnish the additional part needed.'' This is just 
what the court did on affidavit, etc., of counsel for 
respondents. And, it is believed, Rule 75 (e), ''Record 
to be Abbreviated'' does not refer to the qustion here 
presented. It refers to omitting formal parts of exhibits, 
1nore than one copy of any document, omitting irrele-vant 
and formal portions of documents, or for the unneces-
sary substitution by one party of evidence in question 
and answer form for a fair narrative statement pro-
posed by another. None of these things happened, so 
there was no violation of this rule. If the rule were· 
applied as contended for by appellant, then if respon-
dent shall recover upon appeal he would be taxed 
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'vith costs for additional transcript and without which 
he n1ight not have prevailed had fie not ordered more 
than appelTant arbitrarily had: transcribed. It is con-
tended that appellant';s contention is entirely untenable) 
and that the: rule should notbe amend-ed. Nor did the 
court violate any rule': in requiring appellant to furnish 
transcript co:ve:uin1g all evidence. 
IN CON·cr.JUSION- it is submitted that the decision 
of the lower court is fair and equitable· between the 
parties· and finds- support both in. the facts·. and the 
la,v, and that it would. be inequitable at this late date 
to grant appellant's appeaL for recovery of 19 feet (or 
any part- thereof): of ground!, the-· difference between1 
the lines established by the boundary line fenc~ by' 
plaintiff and defendant's predecessors iii interest about· 
45~ yeaTs ago and] the d-escription~ contained· ini deed, 
or· to :require, these· defendants to pay any taxes, etc. 
thereon, particularly when; appellant himself has: paid 
no taxes, etc~, other· than: those· which; covered· the. 
property he has always enjoyed: and been in·· possession 
of, e·ven if it· did not actually on the ground liappen1 
to cov-er tlie description contained~ in the deed~ The 
decision of the~ lower court is entitled to·· be affirmed· 
in all' particulars, together withr respondents~ costs-
In. con:neetion with this appeal .. 
Respectfully submitted,_ 
George C. Heinrich, 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
